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authorTobias Geerinckx-Rice <me@tobias.gr>2018-05-01 13:38:58 +0200
committerTobias Geerinckx-Rice <me@tobias.gr>2018-05-01 13:38:58 +0200
commit2e402618f653f0801358cad74e3030972c975387 (patch)
treedeab069f712e870ebe95541c381c2b9d5379c295 /gnu
parentd13f45646ba2c2944b4c787e40fc73a59089dd9d (diff)
gnu: shadow: Update to 4.6.
* gnu/packages/admin.scm (shadow): Update to 4.6. [source]: Remove upstreamed patch. * gnu/packages/patches/shadow-CVE-2018-7169.patch: Delete file. * gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Remove it.
Diffstat (limited to 'gnu')
-rw-r--r--gnu/local.mk1
-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/admin.scm5
-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/patches/shadow-CVE-2018-7169.patch191
3 files changed, 2 insertions, 195 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/local.mk b/gnu/local.mk
index e78e4c831f..d425828bbc 100644
--- a/gnu/local.mk
+++ b/gnu/local.mk
@@ -1087,7 +1087,6 @@ dist_patch_DATA = \
%D%/packages/patches/scotch-graph-induce-type-64.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/sdl-libx11-1.6.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/seq24-rename-mutex.patch \
- %D%/packages/patches/shadow-CVE-2018-7169.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/sharutils-CVE-2018-1000097.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/shishi-fix-libgcrypt-detection.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/slim-session.patch \
diff --git a/gnu/packages/admin.scm b/gnu/packages/admin.scm
index a9723817b1..4a2fe145f5 100644
--- a/gnu/packages/admin.scm
+++ b/gnu/packages/admin.scm
@@ -358,16 +358,15 @@ hostname.")
(define-public shadow
(package
(name "shadow")
- (version "4.5")
+ (version "4.6")
(source (origin
(method url-fetch)
(uri (string-append
"https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/releases/"
"download/" version "/shadow-" version ".tar.xz"))
- (patches (search-patches "shadow-CVE-2018-7169.patch"))
(sha256
(base32
- "0hdpai78n63l3v3fgr3kkiqzhd0awrpfnnzz4mf7lmxdh61qb37w"))))
+ "10smy01km2bqjjvsd2jz17zvrxbzj89qczyb1amk38j28bcci609"))))
(build-system gnu-build-system)
(arguments
`(;; Assume System V `setpgrp (void)', which is the default on GNU
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/shadow-CVE-2018-7169.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/shadow-CVE-2018-7169.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index eeae5b9b71..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/shadow-CVE-2018-7169.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,191 +0,0 @@
-Fix CVE-2018-7169:
-
-https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-7169
-
-Patch copied from upstream source repository:
-
-https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/fb28c99b8a66ff2605c5cb96abc0a4d975f92de0
-
-From fb28c99b8a66ff2605c5cb96abc0a4d975f92de0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
-Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2018 23:49:40 +1100
-Subject: [PATCH] newgidmap: enforce setgroups=deny if self-mapping a group
-
-This is necessary to match the kernel-side policy of "self-mapping in a
-user namespace is fine, but you cannot drop groups" -- a policy that was
-created in order to stop user namespaces from allowing trivial privilege
-escalation by dropping supplementary groups that were "blacklisted" from
-certain paths.
-
-This is the simplest fix for the underlying issue, and effectively makes
-it so that unless a user has a valid mapping set in /etc/subgid (which
-only administrators can modify) -- and they are currently trying to use
-that mapping -- then /proc/$pid/setgroups will be set to deny. This
-workaround is only partial, because ideally it should be possible to set
-an "allow_setgroups" or "deny_setgroups" flag in /etc/subgid to allow
-administrators to further restrict newgidmap(1).
-
-We also don't write anything in the "allow" case because "allow" is the
-default, and users may have already written "deny" even if they
-technically are allowed to use setgroups. And we don't write anything if
-the setgroups policy is already "deny".
-
-Ref: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/shadow/+bug/1729357
-Fixes: CVE-2018-7169
-Reported-by: Craig Furman <craig.furman89@gmail.com>
-Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
----
- src/newgidmap.c | 89 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
- 1 file changed, 80 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/newgidmap.c b/src/newgidmap.c
-index b1e33513..59a2e75c 100644
---- a/src/newgidmap.c
-+++ b/src/newgidmap.c
-@@ -46,32 +46,37 @@
- */
- const char *Prog;
-
--static bool verify_range(struct passwd *pw, struct map_range *range)
-+
-+static bool verify_range(struct passwd *pw, struct map_range *range, bool *allow_setgroups)
- {
- /* An empty range is invalid */
- if (range->count == 0)
- return false;
-
-- /* Test /etc/subgid */
-- if (have_sub_gids(pw->pw_name, range->lower, range->count))
-+ /* Test /etc/subgid. If the mapping is valid then we allow setgroups. */
-+ if (have_sub_gids(pw->pw_name, range->lower, range->count)) {
-+ *allow_setgroups = true;
- return true;
-+ }
-
-- /* Allow a process to map its own gid */
-- if ((range->count == 1) && (pw->pw_gid == range->lower))
-+ /* Allow a process to map its own gid. */
-+ if ((range->count == 1) && (pw->pw_gid == range->lower)) {
-+ /* noop -- if setgroups is enabled already we won't disable it. */
- return true;
-+ }
-
- return false;
- }
-
- static void verify_ranges(struct passwd *pw, int ranges,
-- struct map_range *mappings)
-+ struct map_range *mappings, bool *allow_setgroups)
- {
- struct map_range *mapping;
- int idx;
-
- mapping = mappings;
- for (idx = 0; idx < ranges; idx++, mapping++) {
-- if (!verify_range(pw, mapping)) {
-+ if (!verify_range(pw, mapping, allow_setgroups)) {
- fprintf(stderr, _( "%s: gid range [%lu-%lu) -> [%lu-%lu) not allowed\n"),
- Prog,
- mapping->upper,
-@@ -89,6 +94,70 @@ static void usage(void)
- exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
- }
-
-+void write_setgroups(int proc_dir_fd, bool allow_setgroups)
-+{
-+ int setgroups_fd;
-+ char *policy, policy_buffer[4096];
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Default is "deny", and any "allow" will out-rank a "deny". We don't
-+ * forcefully write an "allow" here because the process we are writing
-+ * mappings for may have already set themselves to "deny" (and "allow"
-+ * is the default anyway). So allow_setgroups == true is a noop.
-+ */
-+ policy = "deny\n";
-+ if (allow_setgroups)
-+ return;
-+
-+ setgroups_fd = openat(proc_dir_fd, "setgroups", O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC);
-+ if (setgroups_fd < 0) {
-+ /*
-+ * If it's an ENOENT then we are on too old a kernel for the setgroups
-+ * code to exist. Emit a warning and bail on this.
-+ */
-+ if (ENOENT == errno) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, _("%s: kernel doesn't support setgroups restrictions\n"), Prog);
-+ goto out;
-+ }
-+ fprintf(stderr, _("%s: couldn't open process setgroups: %s\n"),
-+ Prog,
-+ strerror(errno));
-+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Check whether the policy is already what we want. /proc/self/setgroups
-+ * is write-once, so attempting to write after it's already written to will
-+ * fail.
-+ */
-+ if (read(setgroups_fd, policy_buffer, sizeof(policy_buffer)) < 0) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, _("%s: failed to read setgroups: %s\n"),
-+ Prog,
-+ strerror(errno));
-+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
-+ }
-+ if (!strncmp(policy_buffer, policy, strlen(policy)))
-+ goto out;
-+
-+ /* Write the policy. */
-+ if (lseek(setgroups_fd, 0, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, _("%s: failed to seek setgroups: %s\n"),
-+ Prog,
-+ strerror(errno));
-+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
-+ }
-+ if (dprintf(setgroups_fd, "%s", policy) < 0) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, _("%s: failed to setgroups %s policy: %s\n"),
-+ Prog,
-+ policy,
-+ strerror(errno));
-+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
-+ }
-+
-+out:
-+ close(setgroups_fd);
-+}
-+
- /*
- * newgidmap - Set the gid_map for the specified process
- */
-@@ -103,6 +172,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
- struct stat st;
- struct passwd *pw;
- int written;
-+ bool allow_setgroups = false;
-
- Prog = Basename (argv[0]);
-
-@@ -145,7 +215,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
- (unsigned long) getuid ()));
- return EXIT_FAILURE;
- }
--
-+
- /* Get the effective uid and effective gid of the target process */
- if (fstat(proc_dir_fd, &st) < 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Could not stat directory for target %u\n"),
-@@ -177,8 +247,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
- if (!mappings)
- usage();
-
-- verify_ranges(pw, ranges, mappings);
-+ verify_ranges(pw, ranges, mappings, &allow_setgroups);
-
-+ write_setgroups(proc_dir_fd, allow_setgroups);
- write_mapping(proc_dir_fd, ranges, mappings, "gid_map");
- sub_gid_close();
-
---
-2.16.2
-