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-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-2-fix.patch51
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 51 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-2-fix.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-2-fix.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index cd097006d2..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-2-fix.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-Patch copied from http://w1.fi/security/2015-2/
-
-From 5acd23f4581da58683f3cf5e36cb71bbe4070bd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2015 17:08:33 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] WPS: Fix HTTP chunked transfer encoding parser
-
-strtoul() return value may end up overflowing the int h->chunk_size and
-resulting in a negative value to be stored as the chunk_size. This could
-result in the following memcpy operation using a very large length
-argument which would result in a buffer overflow and segmentation fault.
-
-This could have been used to cause a denial service by any device that
-has been authorized for network access (either wireless or wired). This
-would affect both the WPS UPnP functionality in a WPS AP (hostapd with
-upnp_iface parameter set in the configuration) and WPS ER
-(wpa_supplicant with WPS_ER_START control interface command used).
-
-Validate the parsed chunk length value to avoid this. In addition to
-rejecting negative values, we can also reject chunk size that would be
-larger than the maximum configured body length.
-
-Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
-reporting this issue.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/wps/httpread.c | 7 +++++++
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/wps/httpread.c b/src/wps/httpread.c
-index 2f08f37..d2855e3 100644
---- a/src/wps/httpread.c
-+++ b/src/wps/httpread.c
-@@ -533,6 +533,13 @@ static void httpread_read_handler(int sd, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
- if (!isxdigit(*cbp))
- goto bad;
- h->chunk_size = strtoul(cbp, NULL, 16);
-+ if (h->chunk_size < 0 ||
-+ h->chunk_size > h->max_bytes) {
-+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+ "httpread: Invalid chunk size %d",
-+ h->chunk_size);
-+ goto bad;
-+ }
- /* throw away chunk header
- * so we have only real data
- */
---
-1.9.1
-