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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"
      xmlns:info="http://planete-kraus.eu/ns/info"
      xml:lang="en">
  <head>
    <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="style.css"/>
    <title>Webid-oidc manual</title>
    <info:subtitle>for version <info:version />,
    <info:updated /></info:subtitle>
    <info:copying>
      <p>
        This is the manual of webid-oidc (version <info:version />,
        <info:updated />), an implementation of the Solid
        authentication protocol for guile, client and server.
      </p>
      <p>Copyright <info:copyright-symbol /> 2020, 2021 Vivien
      Kraus</p>
      <info:quotation>
        <p>
          Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this
          document under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation
          License, Version 1.3 or any later version published by the
          Free Software Foundation; with no Invariant Sections, with no
          Front-Cover Texts, and with no Back-Cover Texts. A copy of the
          license is included in the section entitled ``GNU Free
          Documentation License''
        </p>
      </info:quotation>
    </info:copying>
    <info:author>
      <a href="mailto:vivien@planete-kraus.eu">Vivien Kraus</a>
    </info:author>
    <info:dircategory>
      Software libraries
    </info:dircategory>
    <info:direntry>
      <info:direntry-entry name="webid-oidc">
        Decentralized Authentication on the Web.
      </info:direntry-entry>
    </info:direntry>
  </head>
  <body>
    <h1>Decentralized Authentication on the Web</h1>
    <p>
      Authentication on the web is currently handled in the following
      way: anyone can install a server that will authenticate users on
      the web. The problem is interoperability. If a client (an
      application) wants to authenticate a user, it has to be approved
      by the authentication server. In other words, if
      <info:var>useful-program</info:var> wants to authenticate
      <info:var>MegaCorp</info:var> users, then
      <info:var>useful-program</info:var> has to register to
      <info:var>MegaCorp</info:var> first, and get approved. This goes
      against the principle of permission-less innovation, which is at
      the heart of the web.
    </p>
    <p>
      In the decentralized authentication web, the best attempt so far
      is that of ActivityPub. All servers are interoperable with
      respect to authentication: if user A emits an activity, it is
      forwarded by A's server to its recipients, and A's server is
      responsible for A's identity.
    </p>
    <p>
      The problem with that approach is that the data is tied to the
      application. It is not possible to use another application to
      process the data differently, or to use multiple data sources,
      in an interoperable way (without the ActivityPub server
      knowing). This means that on Activitypub, microblogging
      applications will not present different activities
      correctly. This also means that it is difficult to write a free
      replacement to a non-free application program, because it would
      need to manage the data.
    </p>
    <p>
      In the Solid ecosystem, there is a clear distinction between
      servers and applications. An application is free to read data
      from all places at the same time, using a permission-less
      authentication system. Since the applications do not need to
      store data, the cost of having users is neglectible, so users do
      not need prior approval before using them (making captchas and
      the like a thing of the past). Servers do not have a say in
      which applications the user uses.
    </p>
    <p>
      The authentication used is a slight modification of the
      well-established OpenID Connect. It is intended to work in a web
      browser, but this package demonstrates that it also works
      without a web browser.
    </p>
    <h1>The Json Web Token</h1>
    <p>
      The Json Web Token, or <info:dfn>JWT</info:dfn>, is a terse
      representation of a pair of JSON objects: the
      <info:dfn>header</info:dfn>, and the
      <info:dfn>payload</info:dfn>. The JWT can be
      <info:dfn>encoded</info:dfn> as a Json Web Signature
      (<info:dfn>JWS</info:dfn>), in which case the header is encoded
      to base64 with the URL alphabet, and without padding characters,
      the payload is also encoded to base64, and the concatenation of
      the encoding of the header, a dot, and the encoding of the
      payload is signed with some cryptography algorithm. In the
      following, we will only be interested by public-key
      cryptography. The concatenation of header, dot, payload, dot and
      signature in base64 is the encoding of the JWT.
    </p>
    <p>
      Decoded JWT are represented as a pair. The car of the pair is
      the header, and the cdr is the payload. Both the header and the
      payload use the JSON representation from srfi-180: objects are
      alists of <strong>symbols</strong> to values, arrays are
      vectors. It is unfortunate that guile-json has a slightly
      different representation, where alist keys are
      <emph>strings</emph>, but we hope that in the future SRFI-180
      will be more closely respected.
    </p>
    <h2>The access token</h2>
    <p>
      The access token is obtained by the client through a token
      request, and is presented to the server on each authenticated
      request. It is signed by the identity provider, and it contains
      enough information so that the server knows who the user is and
      who the agent is, and most importantly the fingerprint of the
      key that the client should use in a DPoP proof.
    </p>
    <p>
      The API is defined in
      <emph>(webid-oidc&#160;access-token)</emph>.
    </p>
    <info:deffn type="function" name="access-token?" arguments="object">
      <p>
        Check that <info:var>object</info:var> is a decoded access token.
      </p>
    </info:deffn>
    <p>
      There are field getters for the access token:
    </p>
    <info:deffn type="function" name="access-token-webid" arguments="token">
      <info:deffnx type="function" name="access-token-iss" arguments="token" />
      <info:deffnx type="function" name="access-token-aud" arguments="token" />
      <info:deffnx type="function" name="access-token-exp" arguments="token" />
      <info:deffnx type="function" name="access-token-iat" arguments="token" />
      <info:deffnx type="function" name="access-token-cnf/jkt" arguments="token" />
      <info:deffnx type="function" name="access-token-client-id" arguments="token" />
      <p>
        Get the suitable field from the payload
        of <info:var>token</info:var>.
      </p>
    </info:deffn>
    <p>
      Access tokens can be signed and encoded as a string, or decoded.
    </p>
    <info:deffn type="function" name="access-token-decode" arguments="token [#http-get]">
      <p>
        Decode <info:var>token</info:var>, as a string, into a decoded
        token. As with the ID token, the signature verification will
        need to fetch the oidc configuration of the claimed issuer,
        and check the signature against the published keys. The
        <pre>http-get</pre> optional keyword argument can set a
        different implementation of <pre>http-get</pre> from
        <emph>(web&#160;client)</emph>, for instance to re-use the
        what has been obtained by the ID token validation. Return
        <pre>#f</pre> if it failed, or the decoded token otherwise.
      </p>
    </info:deffn>
    <info:deffn type="function" name="access-token-encode" arguments="token key">
      <p>
        Encode <info:var>token</info:var> and sign it with the
        issuer’s <info:var>key</info:var>.
      </p>
    </info:deffn>
    <info:deffn type="function" name="issue-access-token" arguments="issuer-key #alg #webid #iss #exp #iat [#client-key | #cnf/jkt] #client-id ">
      <p>
        Create an access token, and encode it with
        <info:var>issuer-key</info:var>. You can either set the
        <pre>#:cnf/jkt</pre> keyword argument with the fingerprint of
        the client key, or set <pre>#:client-key</pre> directly, in
        which case the fingerprint will be computed for you.
      </p>
    </info:deffn>
    <h2>Generic JWTs</h2>
    <p>
      You can parse generic JWTs signed with JWS with the following
      functions from <emph>(webid-oidc&#160;jws)</emph>.
    </p>
    <info:deffn type="function" name="jws?" arguments="jwt">
      <p>
        Check that <info:var>jwt</info:var> is a decoded JWT signed
        with JWS.
      </p>
    </info:deffn>
    <info:deffn type="function" name="jws-alg" arguments="jwt">
      <p>
        Get the algorithm used to sign <info:var>jwt</info:var>.
      </p>
    </info:deffn>
    <info:deffn type="function" name="jws-decode" arguments="str lookup-keys">
      <p>
        Check and decode a JWT signed with JWS and encoded
        as <info:var>str</info:var>.
      </p>
      <p>
        Since the decoding and signature verification happen at the
        same time (for user friendliness), the
        <info:var>lookup-keys</info:var> function is used. It is
        passed as arguments the decoded JWT (but the signature is not
        checked yet), and it should return a public key, a public key
        set or a list of public keys. If the key lookup failed, this
        function should raise an exception.
      </p>
    </info:deffn>
    <info:deffn type="function" name="jws-encode" arguments="jwt key">
      <p>
        Encode the JWT and sign it with <info:var>key</info:var>.
      </p>
    </info:deffn>
    <h1>Caching on server side</h1>
    <p>
      Both the identity provider and the resource server need to cache
      things. The identity provider will cache application webids, and
      the resource server will cache the identity provider keys, for
      instance.
    </p>
    <p>
      The solution is to use a file-system cache. Every response
      (except those that have a cache-control policy of no-store) are
      stored to a sub-directory of <emph>XDG_CACHE_HOME</emph>. Each
      store has a 5% chance of triggering a cleanup of the cache. When
      a cleanup occurs, each cached response has a 5% chance of being
      dropped, including responses that are indicated as valid. This
      way, a malicious cache response that has a maliciously long
      validity will not stay too long in the cache. A log line will
      indicate which items are dropped.
    </p>
    <p>
      The <emph>(webid-oidc&#160;cache)</emph> module exports two
      functions to deal with the cache.
    </p>
    <info:deffn type="function" name="clean-cache" arguments="[#percents] [#dir]">
      <p>
        Drop <info:var>percents</info:var>% of the cache right now, in
        <info:var>dir</info:var> (defaults to some place within
        <emph>XDG_CACHE_HOME</emph>).
      </p>
    </info:deffn>
    <info:deffn type="function" name="with-cache" arguments="[#current-time] [#http-get] [#dir]">
      <p>
        Return a function acting as <emph>http-get</emph> from
        <emph>(web&#160;client)</emph> (takes an URI as the first
        parameter, and an optional <info:var>#:headers</info:var> set,
        and returns 2 values, the response and its body).
      </p>
      <p>
        The cache will be read and written in <info:var>dir</info:var>
        (defaults to some place within <emph>XDG_CACHE_HOME</emph>),
        and the <info:var>current-time</info:var> number of seconds,
        SRFI-19 time or date, or time-returning thunk will be used to
        check for the validity of responses.
      </p>
      <p>
        The back-end function, <info:var>http-get</info:var>, defaults
        to that of <emph>(web&#160;client)</emph>.
      </p>
    </info:deffn>
    <h1>What if something goes wrong?</h1>
    <p>
      The library will raise an exception whenever something fishy
      occurs. For instance, if a signature is invalid, or the
      expiration date has passed. All exception types are defined in
      <emph>(webid-oidc errors)</emph>.
    </p>
    <info:deffn type="function" name="error->str" arguments="error [#depth]">
      <p>
        Return a string explaining the <info:var>error</info:var>. You
        can limit the <info:var>depth</info:var> of the explanation as
        an integer.
      </p>
    </info:deffn>
    <info:deftp type="exception type" name="&amp;not-base64" arguments="value cause">
      <p>
        This exception is raised when the base64 decoding function
        failed.  <info:var>value</info:var> is the incorrect input,
        and <info:var>cause</info:var> is a low-level error.
      </p>
    </info:deftp>
    <info:deftp type="exception type" name="&amp;not-json" arguments="value cause">
      <p>
        Cannot decode <info:var>value</info:var> to a JSON object.
      </p>
    </info:deftp>
    <info:deftp type="exception type" name="&amp;unsupported-crv" arguments="crv">
      <p>
        The identifier <info:var>crv</info:var> does not identify an
        elliptic curve.
      </p>
    </info:deftp>
    <info:deftp type="exception type" name="&amp;not-a-jwk" arguments="value cause">
      <p>
        <info:var>value</info:var> does not identify a JWK.
      </p>
    </info:deftp>
    <info:deftp type="exception type" name="&amp;not-a-public-jwk" arguments="value cause">
      <p>
        <info:var>value</info:var> does not identify a public JWK.
      </p>
    </info:deftp>
    <info:deftp type="exception type" name="&amp;not-a-private-jwk" arguments="value cause">
      <p>
        <info:var>value</info:var> does not identify a private JWK.
      </p>
    </info:deftp>
    <info:deftp type="exception type" name="&amp;not-a-jwks" arguments="value cause">
      <p>
        <info:var>value</info:var> does not identify a set of public keys.
      </p>
    </info:deftp>
    <info:deftp type="exception type" name="&amp;unsupported-alg" arguments="value">
      <p>
        <info:var>value</info:var> does not identify a valid hash algorithm.
      </p>
    </info:deftp>
    <info:deftp type="exception type" name="&amp;invalid-signature" arguments="key payload signature">
      <p>
        <info:var>key</info:var> has not signed
        <info:var>payload</info:var> with
        <info:var>signature</info:var>.
      </p>
    </info:deftp>
    <info:deftp type="exception type" name="&amp;missing-alist-key" arguments="value key">
      <p>
        <info:var>value</info:var> isn’t an alist, or is missing a
        value with <info:var>key</info:var>.
      </p>
    </info:deftp>
    <info:deftp type="exception type" name="&amp;not-a-jws-header" arguments="value cause">
      <p>
        <info:var>value</info:var> does not identify a decoded JWS header.
      </p>
    </info:deftp>
    <info:deftp type="exception type" name="&amp;not-a-jws-payload" arguments="value cause">
      <p>
        <info:var>value</info:var> does not identify a decoded JWS payload.
      </p>
    </info:deftp>
    <info:deftp type="exception type" name="&amp;not-a-jws" arguments="value cause">
      <p>
        <info:var>value</info:var> does not identify a decoded JWS.
      </p>
    </info:deftp>
    <info:deftp type="exception type" name="&amp;not-in-3-parts" arguments="string separator">
      <p>
        <info:var>string</info:var> cannot be split into 3 parts with
        <info:var>separator</info:var>.
      </p>
    </info:deftp>
    <info:deftp type="exception type" name="&amp;no-matching-key" arguments="candidates alg payload signature">
      <p>
        No key among <info:var>candidates</info:var> could verify
        <info:var>signature</info:var> signed with
        <info:var>alg</info:var> for <info:var>payload</info:var>,
        because the signature mismatched for all keys.
      </p>
    </info:deftp>
    <info:deftp type="exception type" name="&amp;cannot-decode-jws" arguments="value cause">
      <p>
        The <info:var>value</info:var> string is not an encoding of a valid JWS.
      </p>
    </info:deftp>
    <info:deftp type="exception type" name="&amp;cannot-encode-jws" arguments="jws key cause">
      <p>
        The <info:var>jws</info:var> cannot be signed.
      </p>
    </info:deftp>
    <info:deftp type="exception type" name="&amp;request-failed-unexpectedly" arguments="response-code response-reason-phrase">
      <p>
        We expected the request to succeed, but the server sent a
        non-OK <info:var>response-code</info:var>.
      </p>
    </info:deftp>
    <info:deftp type="exception type" name="&amp;unexpected-header-value" arguments="header value">
      <p>
        We did not expect the server to respond with
        <info:var>header</info:var> set to <info:var>value</info:var>.
      </p>
    </info:deftp>
    <info:deftp type="exception type" name="&amp;unexpected-response" arguments="response cause">
      <p>
        The <info:var>response</info:var> (from
        <emph>(web response)</emph>) is not appropriate.
      </p>
    </info:deftp>
    <info:deftp type="exception type" name="&amp;not-an-oidc-configuration" arguments="value cause">
      <p>
        The <info:var>value</info:var> is not an OIDC configuration.
      </p>
    </info:deftp>
    <info:deftp type="exception type" name="&amp;incorrect-webid-field" arguments="value">
      <p>
	The <info:var>value</info:var> of the webid field in the JWT
	is missing (if <pre>#f</pre>), or not an acceptable value.
      </p>
    </info:deftp>
    <info:deftp type="exception type" name="&amp;incorrect-iss-field" arguments="value">
      <p>
	The <info:var>value</info:var> of the iss field is incorrect.
      </p>
    </info:deftp>
    <info:deftp type="exception type" name="&amp;incorrect-aud-field" arguments="value">
      <p>
	The <info:var>value</info:var> of the aud field is incorrect.
      </p>
    </info:deftp>
    <info:deftp type="exception type" name="&amp;incorrect-iat-field" arguments="value">
      <p>
	The <info:var>value</info:var> of the iat field is incorrect.
      </p>
    </info:deftp>
    <info:deftp type="exception type" name="&amp;incorrect-exp-field" arguments="value">
      <p>
	The <info:var>value</info:var> of the exp field is incorrect.
      </p>
    </info:deftp>
    <info:deftp type="exception type" name="&amp;incorrect-cnf/jkt-field" arguments="value">
      <p>
	The <info:var>value</info:var> of the cnf/jkt field is incorrect.
      </p>
    </info:deftp>
    <info:deftp type="exception type" name="&amp;incorrect-client-id-field" arguments="value">
      <p>
	The <info:var>value</info:var> of the client-id field is incorrect.
      </p>
    </info:deftp>
    <info:deftp type="exception type" name="&amp;not-an-access-token" arguments="value cause">
      <p>
        The <info:var>value</info:var> is not an access token.
      </p>
    </info:deftp>
    <info:deftp type="exception type" name="&amp;not-an-access-token-header" arguments="value cause">
      <p>
        The <info:var>value</info:var> is not an access token header.
      </p>
    </info:deftp>
    <info:deftp type="exception type" name="&amp;not-an-access-token-payload" arguments="value cause">
      <p>
        The <info:var>value</info:var> is not an access token payload.
      </p>
    </info:deftp>
    <info:deftp type="exception type" name="&amp;cannot-fetch-issuer-configuration" arguments="issuer cause">
      <p>
	It is impossible to fetch the configuration of
	<info:var>issuer</info:var>.
      </p>
    </info:deftp>
    <info:deftp type="exception type" name="&amp;cannot-fetch-jwks" arguments="issuer uri cause">
      <p>
	It is impossible to fetch the keys of
	<info:var>issuer</info:var> at <info:var>uri</info:var>.
      </p>
    </info:deftp>
    <info:deftp type="exception type" name="&amp;cannot-decode-access-token" arguments="value cause">
      <p>
        The <info:var>value</info:var> string is not an encoding of a
        valid access token.
      </p>
    </info:deftp>
    <info:deftp type="exception type" name="&amp;cannot-encode-access-token" arguments="access-token key cause">
      <p>
        The <info:var>access-token</info:var> cannot be signed.
      </p>
    </info:deftp>

    <h1 type="appendix">GNU Free Documentation License</h1>
    <info:gfdl />

    <h1 type="unnumbered">Index</h1>
    <info:printindex />
  </body>
</html>

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